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Two studies examined the effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in reducing the 
aversiveness of ingroup and outgroup ostracism. It was hypothesized that in the case of ingroup 
ostracism, self-affirmation (but not group-affirmation) would be more effective in buffering 
against negative reactions than no-affirmation, whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, group-
affirmation (but not self-affirmation) would be more effective than no-affirmation. Both studies 
employed a 3 (affirmation: self vs. group vs. no) × 2 (ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) between-
participants design. After completing a self-affirming, group-affirming, or non-affirming writing 
task, undergraduates were ostracized by either ingroup or outgroup members in a three-person 
Cyberball game. Participants in Study 1 (strong ostracism) and Study 2 (moderate ostracism) 
received the ball on 6.7% and 16.7% out of thirty tosses, respectively. In Study 1, participants 
reported uniformly high levels of aversiveness and negative emotions across the six conditions. 
In Study 2, in the ingroup ostracism condition, self-affirmed participants, but not group-affirmed 
participants, reported significantly lower aversiveness and less negative emotion than did non-
affirmed participants. In the outgroup ostracism condition, neither self- nor group-affirmation 
reduced negative responses relative to no affirmation. Implications and suggestions for future 
studies are discussed. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are social animals. As many psychologists have pointed out, the desire to be 
accepted by others is one of the most basic and pervasive human needs (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995), and thus people put great value on social connections and are responsive to how other 
people treat them. Given the fundamental nature of belonging needs, it is not surprising that 
fulfillment of a need to belong leads to a variety of positive outcomes. For example, a secure 
connection with others serves as the major source of positive self-regard (e.g., Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and positively affects both physical health (e.g., 
Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010; Uchino, 2004) and mental health (e.g., Feeney & Collins, 
2014; Lakey & Orehek, 2011).  
Just as social acceptance is rewarding and beneficial to well-being, so lack of social 
connections, including being excluded by others, is threatening and painful (e.g., MacDonald & 
Leary, 2005; Williams, 2009). Indeed, evidence suggests that ostracism -- being excluded or 
ignored by others -- produces a variety of negative consequences. Ostracism is often studied 
using the Cyberball paradigm (Williams & Jarvis, 2006), in which participants are included or 
excluded by two other ostensible players (who are in fact computer-controlled avatars) while 
playing a computerized ball-toss game. Whereas participants in the inclusion condition receive 
the ball the same number of times as the other players, those in the exclusion condition typically 
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receive the ball twice at the beginning and never again for the remainder of the game (which 
lasts for approximately 2.5 minutes). 
A large body of research using this paradigm suggests that ostracism is highly threatening 
because it threatens fundamental human needs (i.e., belonging, self-esteem, control, meaningful 
existence; for a review, see Williams, 2009). The aversive impact of ostracism is revealed on a 
variety of self-report measures as well as physiological measures, such blood pressure and 
cortisol level (e.g., Stroud, Tanofsky-Kraff, Wilfley, & Salovey, 2000). Evidence also indicates 
that ostracism activates the brain regions associated with physical pain (e.g., Eisenberger, 
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Moreover, the negative impact of ostracism is quite robust. For 
example, negative responses to ostracism are not moderated by personal characteristics of 
recipients, such as trait-level self-esteem (Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998), gender 
(Williams & Sommer, 1997), or social anxiety (Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006). In addition, 
ostracism is highly aversive even when ostracizers are computer-programmed (Zadro, Williams, 
& Richardson, 2004) or when the exclusion is ostensibly unintentional (Eisenberger et al., 2003). 
Moreover, whether ostracism involves people who belong to the recipient’s own group (i.e., 
ingroup members) or a different group (i.e., outgroup members) has little impact on its 
aversiveness. This is true when recipients and ostracizers use the same or different computer 
platforms (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), are of the same or different genders (Wirth & 
Williams, 2009), belong to the same or different ethnic groups (Goodwin et al., 2010), go to the 
same or different schools (Williams et al., 2002, Study 2), or have the same or different opinions 
or values (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Williams et al., 2002,  Study 3). 
Although both ingroup and outgroup ostracism are highly aversive, the psychological 
mechanisms that underlie their aversiveness may differ. In the case of ostracism by ingroup 
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members, rejection is likely to be attributed to the ostracizers’ negative evaluations of one’s 
personal characteristics. This attribution, in turn, should threaten the positivity of one’s self-
image, or personal identity. In contrast, in the case of ostracism by outgroup members, rejection 
is likely to be attributed to the ostracizers’ negative evaluations of one’s group. This attribution, 
in turn, should threaten the positivity of one’s ingroup-image, or social identity (cf. Branscombe, 
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). 
To the extent that ingroup and outgroup ostracism induce different kinds of threat -- to 
personal and social identity, respectively -- then different buffers may be effective in reducing 
the aversiveness of the two kinds of ostracism. More specifically, in the case of ingroup 
ostracism, bolstering a recipients’ personal identity may be particularly useful in reducing 
aversiveness. In contrast, in the case of outgroup ostracism, bolstering a recipient’s social 
identity may be particularly useful. Following this logic, in the present studies, we tested the 
efficacy of two threat-alleviating strategies for reducing the aversiveness of ingroup and 
outgroup ostracism -- self-affirmation and group-affirmation. 
1.1 SELF- AND GROUP-AFFIRMATION  
Self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) suggests that people are 
motivated to maintain a global sense of self-worth. According to this theory, threatening events 
or information that call self-worth into question trigger defensive reactions aimed to reduce the 
threat. However, when people are able to strengthen their sense of self-worth, they view 
themselves as capable and adaptive and thus have less need to respond defensively to the threat.  
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A standard technique for enhancing self-worth is self-affirmation, which is often induced 
by asking participants to write about a value that is important to them as an individual (see 
McQueen & Klein, 2006, for a discussion of self-affirmation inductions). Engaging in this 
activity is assumed to strengthen participants’ sense of self-worth (Sherman, 2013) and thereby 
help them cope with threat. A large body of research supports this assumption. For example, self-
affirmation reduces people’s tendency to engage in dissonance-motivated justifications and self-
serving judgments (Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele & Liu, 1983), lowers their defensive 
responses to fear of death (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005), increases their scrutiny of persuasive 
messages that challenge their viewpoint (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004), promotes their open-
mindedness to threatening health information (Epton & Harris, 2008), and attenuates their 
physiological reactions to stress (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 
2009).  
Extending the idea that self-affirmation can reduce threat to personal identity, several 
studies have examined the impact of group-affirmation on threat to social identity. Group-
affirmation is usually induced by asking participants to write about a value that is important to 
their ingroup (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  Research has shown that group-affirmation is effective 
in reducing defensiveness against collective threat and promoting open-mindedness to ingroup-
threatening events or information (for exceptions, see Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011, and Ehrlich & 
Gramzow, 2015). For example, group-affirmation reduces people’s group-serving attributions in 
the face of the ingroup’s failure (Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007), increases 
the likelihood they will acknowledge the ingroup’s wrongdoing and feel guilt and shame about 
the wrongdoing (Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010), reduces their 
dissonance-driven discomfort when the ingroup’s behavior does not fit with their personal beliefs 
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(Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), and reduces their defensiveness during intergroup 
competition (Pettit & Lount, 2010). Evidence suggests that such effects are more pronounced for 
members who are more strongly identified with their ingroup (e.g., Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 
2009; Glasford et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007). 
1.2 SELECTIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF SELF- AND GROUP-AFFIRMATION 
Most prior affirmation studies induced either self- or group-affirmation and examined its effect 
relative to a no-affirmation control condition (see McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 
2006), whereas a few studies manipulated both kinds of affirmation without explicit predictions 
regarding when each would be more effective (e.g., Derks et al., 2009; Glasford et al., 2009; 
Pettit & Lount, 2010; Sherman et al., 2007). Importantly, no prior study addressed our major 
question, namely the relative efficacy of self- and group-affirmation in reducing personal and 
social identity threat. In the present studies, we assumed that the match between the level of 
identity being threatened by ostracism and the level of identity being bolstered by affirmation 
would be critical in determining the efficacy of affirmation. Specifically, we predicted that when 
personal identity is threatened, self-affirmation would be particularly effective in buffering 
against ostracism threat. In contrast, when social identity is threatened, group-affirmation would 
be particularly effective.  
Some prior work is consistent with this “matching” hypothesis. For example, in the 
context of stereotype threat, Shapiro, Williams, and Hambarchyan (2012) compared two kinds of 
threat-alleviating strategies, one designed to protect personal identity (self-affirmation) and one 
designed to protect social identity (ingroup role model intervention). They found that self-
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affirmation, but not the ingroup role model intervention, alleviated threat when members of the 
stigmatized group perceived the stereotype threat as personally relevant. In contrast, when 
members perceived the stereotype threat as ingroup relevant, the ingroup role model 
intervention, but not self-affirmation, alleviated threat. This finding suggests that threat-
alleviating strategies are effective primarily when they enhance the specific identity being 
threatened. In addition, past research has shown that self-affirmation led to increased 
accessibility of cognitions associated with personal identity, whereas group-affirmation led to 
increased accessibility of cognitions associated with social identity (Derks et al., 2009). These 
findings suggest that self-affirmation may provide psychological resources required to buffer 
against a threat to personal identity, because it reminds individuals of other valued aspects of 
themselves and thus enables them to construe the threat situation in a broader perspective 
(Critcher & Dunning, 2014). Likewise, when a threat is posed to social identity, group-
affirmation may remind individuals of other positive characteristics of the ingroup, which serve 
as psychological resources to buffer against the threat to their social identity (see Lalonde, 1992). 
1.3 CURRENT STUDIES 
In two studies, we examined the effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in reducing the 
aversiveness of ingroup and outgroup ostracism. We assumed that ingroup and outgroup 
ostracism threaten different levels of identity -- exclusion by ingroup members is likely to 
threaten personal identity, whereas exclusion by outgroup members is likely to threaten social 
identity. We hypothesized that in the case of ingroup ostracism, self-affirmation (but not group-
affirmation) would be more effective in buffering against negative reactions than no-affirmation, 
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whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, group-affirmation (but not self-affirmation) would be 
more effective than no-affirmation. Both studies employed a 3 (affirmation: self vs. group vs. no) 
× 2 (ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) between-participants design. After completing a self-
affirming, group-affirming, or non-affirming writing task, undergraduates were ostracized by 
either ingroup or outgroup members in a three-person Cyberball game. The studies differed in 
level of ostracism – strong in Study 1 and moderate in Study 2. 
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2.0  PILOT STUDY 
As noted above, prior research has operationalized ingroup and outgroup ostracism in various 
ways, one of which involves varying whether the ostracizers are from the participants’ own 
school or another school (e.g., Williams et al., 2002). We used this manipulation in the current 
studies because it has also been used in research on self- vs. group-affirmation (e.g., Pettit & 
Lount, 2010; Sherman et al., 2007). The aim of this pilot study was to choose an appropriate 
source of outgroup ostracism for University of Pittsburgh (Pitt) students. To accomplish this 
goal, we tested the suitability of several neighboring universities. 
2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Forty-nine (14 men) undergraduates at the University of Pittsburgh (Pitt) participated for course 
credit in an introductory psychology course. After being informed that they were participating in 
a survey on intergroup perception, they completed a questionnaire concerning five universities -- 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), Penn State University (PSU), West Virginia University 
(WVU), Syracuse University (SU), and Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP). After filling 
out the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
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2.1.2 Materials 
For each of the five universities, Pitt students’ attitudes toward students of that university and 
Pitt students’ assumptions about the attitudes of those (outgroup) students toward Pitt students 
were measured. For the former, participants used 7-point scales to indicate their perceptions of 
outgroup students on six dimensions (1 = warm to 7 = cold, 1 = lazy to 7 = industrious, 1= 
intelligent to 7 = unintelligent, 1= arrogant to 7 = modest, 1 = prejudiced to 7 = unprejudiced, 
and 1 = academically motivated to 7 = not academically motivated). In addition, participants 
used 7-point scales (1 = not at all to 7 = a great deal) to indicate Pitt students’ feelings of 
similarity to outgroup students (i.e., “How similar do Pitt students feel to XXX students?”) and 
Pitt students’ evaluations of those students (i.e., “How much do Pitt students like and respect 
XXX students?”). Parallel items were used to measure the assumed attitudes of outgroup 
students toward Pitt students (e.g., “How similar do XXX students feel to Pitt students?”). The 
order of the five outgroup universities was counterbalanced across participants. 
2.2 RESULTS 
Participants’ responses to the eight items measuring Pitt students’ attitudes toward outgroup 
students were highly inter-correlated for each school (Cronbach’s alphas > .62). Similarly, 
participants’ responses to the eight items measuring Pitt students’ assumptions about the attitudes 
of outgroup students toward Pitt students were highly inter-correlated for each school 
(Cronbach’s alphas > .63). Therefore, two composite scores were computed by reverse-coding 
responses to appropriate items and averaging the eight responses, resulting in two attitude indices 
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(Pitt attitude; Outgroup attitude) for each of the five outgroup universities. For both indices, 
higher values reflected more positive attitudes.  
Two criteria were used to select an outgroup for the ostracism manipulation. The first 
concerned the absolute values of the two composite scores. Our goal was to identify universities 
that Pitt students viewed negatively and that they assumed reciprocated this view. Thus, we were 
interested in universities for which both attitude indices were lower than the mid-point of the 
response scale (4). Two schools satisfied this criterion: WVU (MPitt attitude = 2.93, SDPitt attitude = 
1.07; MOutgroup attitude = 3.67; SDOutgroup attitude = 0.83) and PSU (MPitt attitude = 3.46, SDPitt attitude = 
0.94; MOutgroup attitude = 3.85; SDOutgroup attitude = 0.83). All other schools had at least one mean 
above the mid-point of the scale. The second criterion concerned the difference between the two 
composite indices. This difference reflects the similarity between Pitt students’ attitudes toward 
outgroup students and Pitt students’ assumptions about the attitudes of outgroup students toward 
Pitt students. Our goal was to identify the university (WVU or PSU) that yielded the smaller 
difference score. Because PSU (Mdiscrepancy = 0.65, SDdiscrepancy = 0.77) yielded a smaller 
difference score than did WVU (Mdiscrepancy = 0.83, SDdiscrepancy = 0.78), PSU was chosen as the 
outgroup for the ostracism manipulation (see Table 1 for Ms and SDs of composite attitude 
indices for all five universities). 
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3.0  STUDY 1 
In this study, participants (Pitt undergraduates) completed an affirmation writing task and then 
engaged in a computerized ball-toss game (Cyberball) which was pre-programmed to exclude 
them. Two independent variables were manipulated – type of affirmation (self, group, none) and 
source of ostracism (ingroup, outgroup). After completing the game, participants responded to a 
questionnaire assessing their experience during the game. It was predicted that, in the case of 
ingroup ostracism, self-affirmation (but not group-affirmation) would be more effective than no-
affirmation in buffering against negative reactions, whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, 
group-affirmation (but not self-affirmation) would be more effective than no-affirmation. 
3.1 METHOD 
3.1.1 Participants and design 
Participants were 151 undergraduates (68 men) at the University of Pittsburgh who participated 
for course credit in an introductory psychology course. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
between-participants design. Fourteen participants were excluded from data analysis, thirteen 
who showed suspicion about the Cyberball task and one who did not correctly recall his or her 
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co-players’ university affiliation. The final number of participants in each of the six conditions 
was: self-affirmation/ingroup (23), self-affirmation/outgroup (22), group-affirmation/ingroup 
(21), group-affirmation/outgroup (24), no-affirmation/ingroup (24), and no-affirmation/outgroup 
(23).1 
3.1.2 Procedure 
From two to six participants were brought to the laboratory, which contained six cubicles 
equipped with computers. Participants were informed that they were participating a computer-
based mental visualization study and that they would be asked to exercise their visualization 
skills while interacting with others in an online setting. After completing informed consent 
forms, participants completed a 10-item questionnaire supposedly measuring their mental 
visualization tendencies. This questionnaire has been used to enhance the plausibility of 
ostracism manipulations in prior studies (e.g., Bernstein, Sacco, Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 
2010; Sacco, Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2014). In addition, the questionnaire contained 
four additional items, adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), to assess participants’ level of 
group identification (e.g., ‘Being a Pitt student is an important reflection of who I am”). These 
items were included because previous research has suggested that group identification can 
moderate the effect of group-affirmation (e.g., Derks, et al., 2009; Glasford et al., 2009; 
Sherman, et al., 2007).2 Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  
After completing the questionnaire, participants were informed about the main part of the 
experiment. They were told that, because this study was a joint project with researchers at PSU, 
another session was running simultaneously at PSU. In addition, they were told that another 
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session at Pitt was also running.  Participants were further informed that they would play an 
online ball-toss game with two other students who were located either in the lab at PSU or in the 
other lab at Pitt. In reality, there were no other sessions, and the other “participants” were 
actually computer-controlled avatars.  
The experimenter then told participants that he needed to contact the other labs by email 
to check whether they were ready to start. In the meantime, participants were asked to complete a 
writing task, which was introduced as an unrelated study. This task was used to manipulate type 
of affirmation. In the self-affirmation condition, participants were instructed to think about a 
value that was important to them personally and that they viewed as positive. They were then 
asked to describe why the value was important and meaningful to them as an individual and how 
they demonstrated the importance of the value. In the group-affirmation condition, participants 
were instructed to think about a value that was important to University of Pittsburgh students and 
that they viewed as positive. They were then asked to describe why the value was important and 
meaningful to University of Pittsburgh students and how Pitt students demonstrated the 
importance of the value. In the no-affirmation condition, participants were instructed to think 
about a value that was important to middle-aged Americans but was not important to them. They 
were then asked to describe why the value might be important and meaningful to middle-aged 
Americans and how middle-aged Americans demonstrated the importance of the value. Similar 
writing tasks have been used in prior research on self- and group-affirmation (e.g., Miron et al., 
2010; Sherman et al., 2007; see also McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
After five minutes, the experimenter collected participants’ written materials and made 
two simulated phone calls, one to each of the other ostensible labs, to check whether they were 
ready to begin. After the phone calls, participants were directed to start Cyberball by turning on 
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the computer monitors in their booths. They then saw a brief description of the Cyberball game, 
which emphasized that they should mentally visualize the game situation as vividly as possible 
during their subsequent play. The program then took a few seconds to ostensibly check whether 
“all players” were online, after which it asked participants to indicate their university affiliation 
and briefly introduce themselves to their co-players, describing their hometown, hobbies, 
favorite foods, etc., by typing in a text box. Participants sent this information to their ostensible 
co-players by clicking “Submit your information.” After a few seconds, information from co- 
players, which indicated their university affiliation and their personal information, appeared on 
participants’ screens (for a similar procedure, see Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). Although the 
content of co-players’ comments was held constant across the six conditions, their university 
affiliation was manipulated according to the ostracism condition. In the ingroup ostracism 
condition, co-players were both Pitt students. In the outgroup ostracism condition, co-players 
were both PSU students.  
Participants then began the ball-toss game by clicking “Start to play.” The game depicted 
three avatars, the middle one representing the participant and labeled as “You.” The two co-
players’ avatars were labeled “Player 1” and “Player 2,” and both were given the designation of 
either “Pitt” or “Penn State” (see Figures 1 and 2). Participants were instructed that, whenever 
they received the ball, they should toss it to one of the two avatars by clicking on the chosen 
avatar. The game consisted of 30 throws and lasted approximately 2.5 minutes. During the game, 
participants were ostracized by their co-players, in that they received the ball twice at the 
beginning of the game and never again for the remaining throws. This ratio of receptions to total 
throws (6.7%) has been used to induce ostracism in many prior studies (e.g., Van Beest, Carter-
Sowell, Van Dijk, & Williams, 2012; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Wirth & Williams, 2009; 
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Zadro et al., 2006). Upon completion of the Cyberball game, participants filled out a 
questionnaire assessing their experience during the game. At the end of the session, participants 
were debriefed about the methods and aims of the study and dismissed. 
3.1.3 Measures  
3.1.3.1 Manipulation checks  Two kinds of manipulation checks were included, one measuring 
the effectiveness of the ostracism induction and the other measuring the attribution for exclusion. 
Effectiveness of ostracism induction.  We assessed whether the ostracism induction was 
successful using two items (“I was ignored” and “I was excluded”). Participants responded to 
each item using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). Because the ratings of the two 
items were highly correlated (r = .55, p < .001), they were averaged to produce a combined 
score. Also, participants responded to the question, “Assuming the ball should be thrown to each 
person equally (33%), what percentage of the throws did you receive?,” by reporting the percent 
of throws they received during the game.   
Attribution for exclusion.  We also assessed whether ingroup ostracism and outgroup ostracism 
were attributed to different causes, namely participants’ personal characteristics in the former 
case and participants’ group membership in the latter case. Two items were used to assess 
attributions to personal characteristics (“During the game, I thought the other players chose to 
throw or not throw the ball to me because of my personal characteristics” and “During the game, 
I thought the other players chose to throw or not throw the ball to me because of things that are 
unique to me”). In addition, two items were used to assess attributions to group membership 
(“During the game, I thought the other players chose to throw or not throw the ball to me 
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because of the university I attend” and “During the game, I thought the other players chose to 
throw or not throw the ball to me because of their view about Pitt students”). Participants 
responded to each question using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Responses to the former two questions were averaged to create an index of personal attribution (r 
= .74, p <.001), and responses to the latter two questions were averaged to create an index of 
group membership attribution (r = .84, p < .001), with higher scores reflecting stronger 
attributions in both cases.  
3.1.3.2 Ostracism aversiveness  One measure of the impact of ostracism was based on 
participants’ responses to a 20-item Need Satisfaction Scale developed by Williams (Williams, 
2009; Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004). This scale was designed to assess the negative 
impact of ostracism on four human needs, belonging (e.g., ‘I felt I belonged to the group’), self-
esteem (e.g., ‘I felt good about myself’), control (e.g., “I felt I had control over the course of the 
game’), and meaningful existence (e.g., ‘I felt important’). For each item, participants were 
asked to indicate how they felt during the Cyberball game using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all to 
5 = extremely). Consistent with prior research, an overall aversiveness score was computed for 
each participant by reverse-coding responses to appropriate items and then averaging responses 
across the 20 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .86), with higher scores reflecting greater aversiveness.  
3.1.3.3 Emotional reactions  A second measure of the impact of ostracism was based on 
participants’ assessments of their emotional reactions during the game. Participants responded to 
six items, three reflecting positive emotions (good, pleasant, happy) and three reflecting negative 
emotions (bad, sad, angry), using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). Separate 
indices of emotional reaction were computed by averaging responses to positive items 
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(Cronbach’s alpha = .88) and negative items (Cronbach’s alpha = .76), with higher scores 
indicating stronger emotion in both cases. 
3.1.3.4 Hostility  For exploratory purposes, we assessed participants’ hostility toward (a) the co-
players who had ostracized them and (b) the co-players’ group (Schaafsma & Williams, 2014). 
Hostility toward co-players was assessed by four items (“I would like to swear at the other 
players,” “I would like to continue playing with the other players,” “I would like to insult the 
other players,” and “I would like to make fun of the other players”) using a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Hostility toward co-players’ group was assessed by four 
items with the following instructions, “Please describe how you feel when thinking about the 
university your co-players attend” (1 = not angry to 7 = angry, 1 = not aggressive to 7 = 
aggressive, 1 = not hostile to 7 = hostile, and 1 = not friendly to 7 = friendly). Responses to the 
first set of items were averaged to create an index of hostility toward co-players (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .74), and responses to the second set of items were averaged to create an index of 
hostility toward co-players’ group (Cronbach’s alpha = .85), with higher scores indicating greater 
hostility in both cases. 
3.2 RESULTS 
3.2.1 Manipulation checks 
3.2.1.1 Effectiveness of ostracism induction  To determine the extent to which participants felt 
excluded during the Cyberball game, we analyzed the combined score based on the two 
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exclusion items using a 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) ANOVA. Results revealed that neither of the main effects (type of 
affirmation, source of ostracism) nor the interaction was statistically significant, all Fs < 0.47, ps 
> .64, indicating that perceived exclusion was similar across the six conditions. Moreover, the 
overall level of perceived exclusion (Mgrand = 4.49, SDgrand = 0.79) was significantly higher than 
the mid-point of the response scale (3), t(136) = 22.04, p <.001. In addition, we performed a 3 × 
2 ANOVA on the percentage of throws that participants believed they received during the game. 
Results showed that neither of the main effects nor the interaction was statistically significant, all 
Fs < 1.48, ps > .23. Participants reported receiving an average of 5.61% (SD = 3.42) of the 
throws during the game, which was significantly lower than the 6.7% of throws they actually 
received, t(136) = 3.74, p < .001. Taken together, these findings indicated that participants 
experienced a high level of ostracism.  
3.2.1.2 Attribution for exclusion  We also assessed whether participants excluded by ingroup 
members attributed the ostracism to their personal characteristics, whereas those excluded by 
outgroup members attributed it to their group membership. To answer this question, we analyzed 
responses to the two attribution index scores using a 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. 
none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) x (2) (attribution type: personal 
characteristics vs. group membership) mixed ANOVA with type of affirmation and source of 
ostracism as between-participants variables and attribution type as a within-participants variable.  
We obtained two significant main effects and one significant interaction. The source of 
ostracism main effect indicated that outgroup ostracism (M = 4.18, SD = 1.58) triggered stronger 
overall attributions than did ingroup ostracism (M = 2.27, SD = 1.15), F(1, 131) = 122.87, p < 
.001. The attribution type main effect indicated that participants attributed exclusion more to 
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group membership (M = 3.50, SD = 2.39) than to personal characteristics (M = 2.97, SD = 1.59), 
F(1, 131) = 9.59, p = .002. Of greater interest was the source of ostracism × attribution type 
interaction, F(1, 131) = 167.05, p < .001. This interaction revealed that, as expected, participants 
excluded by ingroup members attributed their treatment more to their personal characteristics (M 
= 3.12, SD = 1.53) than to their group membership (M = 1.43, SD = 0.76), F(1, 131) = 48.64, p 
<.001, while those excluded by outgroup members attributed their treatment more to their group 
membership (M = 5.54, SD = 1.52) than to their personal characteristics  (M = 2.82, SD = 1.64), 
F(1, 131) = 129.23, p < .001.  
3.2.2 Ostracism aversiveness 
We predicted that self- and group-affirmation would selectively reduce the aversiveness of 
ingroup and outgroup ostracism, respectively. More specifically, we predicted that in the case of 
ingroup ostracism, self-affirmation (but not group-affirmation) would be more effective than no-
affirmation, whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, group-affirmation (but not self-
affirmation) would be more effective than no-affirmation. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed 
aversiveness scores using a 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of 
ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANOVA (see Table 2). Neither of the main effects nor the 
interaction attained statistical significance, all Fs < 0.67, ps > .41. Overall, the aversiveness of 
the Cyberball game (Mgrand = 4.12, SDgrand = 0.52) was significantly higher than the mid-point of 
the response scale (3), t(136) = 25.20, p <.001. Thus, although participants generally viewed the 
Cyberball game as aversive, our prediction that self- and group-affirmation would selectively 
reduce the aversiveness of ingroup and outgroup ostracism, respectively, was not supported.  
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3.2.3 Emotional reactions  
We analyzed the two emotion indices using 3 × 2 ANOVAs (see Table 3). For positive emotions, 
neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained statistical significance, all Fs < 1.41, ps > 
.24. Overall, participants' level of positive emotion during the game (Mgrand = 2.21, SDgrand = 
0.88) was significantly lower than the mid-point of the response scale (3), t(136) = 10.53, p 
<.001.  
For negative emotions, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained statistical 
significance, all Fs < 0.54, ps >.59. Overall, participants' level of negative emotion during the 
game (Mgrand = 3.20, SDgrand = 0.99) was significantly higher than the mid-point of the response 
scale (3), t(136) = 2.42, p =.02.  
3.2.4 Hostility  
The two hostility index scores (hostility toward co-players and hostility toward co-players’ 
group) were analyzed using 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of 
ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANOVAs (see Table 4). For hostility toward co-players, neither 
of the main effects nor the interaction attained statistical significance, all Fs < 1.67, ps > .19. 
Overall, participants' hostility toward co-players (Mgrand = 3.75, SDgrand = 1.35) was significantly 
lower than the mid-point of the response scale (4), t(136) = 2.17, p = .03. For hostility toward co-
players’ group, the source of ostracism main effect was significant, F(1, 131) = 14.48, p < .001, 
indicating that participants who were excluded by outgroup members (M = 3.44, SD = 1.49) felt 
stronger hostility than did those who were excluded by ingroup members (M = 2.54, SD = 1.27). 
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The type of affirmation main effect and the interaction did not attain statistical significance, both 
Fs < 0.85, ps > .43.  
3.3 DISCUSSION 
Based on the assumption that ingroup ostracism would induce threat to personal identity and that 
outgroup ostracism would induce threat to social identity, the current study attempted to test the 
selective effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in reducing the aversiveness of ingroup and 
outgroup ostracism, respectively. Our manipulations were successful, in that participants 
experienced a high level of ostracism. Moreover, participants ostracized by ingroup members 
attributed their exclusion predominantly to personal characteristics, while those ostracized by 
outgroup members attributed their exclusion predominantly to group membership. Nonetheless, 
our hypothesis regarding the differential impact of self- and group-affirmation on responses to 
ingroup and outgroup ostracism was not supported. In fact, neither kind of affirmation was 
effective in reducing the negative effects of either form of ostracism relative to the no-
affirmation condition. Thus, even though participants had an opportunity to affirm at the 
personal level or group level, they reported that exclusion from both ingroup and outgroup 
members was relatively aversive (produced low need satisfaction) and that this exclusion elicited 
relatively low positive emotions and relatively high negative emotions. Finally, only one 
significant finding emerged regarding hostility -- participants excluded by outgroup members 
revealed greater hostility toward co-players’ group than did participants excluded by ingroup 
members. This finding is perhaps not surprising, because, in the case of ingroup ostracism, co-
players’ group was also participants’ group (see also Schaafsma & Williams, 2009). 
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Why did we not obtain support for our hypothesis? One possible reason concerns the 
magnitude of the ostracism in our study. As in prior studies, we induced “extreme” ostracism by 
giving participants the ball only twice at the beginning of the game and never again. As 
expected, participants in all conditions reported substantial exclusion. Our failure to find effects 
of source of ostracism and type of affirmation is consistent with prior studies indicating that 
responses to ostracism do not vary as a function of various situational variables, including 
whether ostracizers are ostensibly real people vs. computer-programmed avatars (Zadro et al, 
2004), whether exclusion is ostensibly intentional vs. unintentional (Eisenberger et al., 2003), 
and whether ostracizers are ostensibly ingroup vs. outgroup members (e.g., Gonsalkorale & 
Williams, 2007). In other words, the pain of ostracism in our study may have been so 
overwhelming that our situational variables were unable to produce effects. Based on this 
speculation, Study 2 attempted to test our hypothesis using a milder form of ostracism. 
 23 
4.0  STUDY 2 
The aim of Study 2 was to examine the effect of self- and group-affirmation on responses to 
“moderate” ingroup and outgroup ostracism. As in Study 1, we predicted that in the case of 
ingroup ostracism, self-affirmation (but not group-affirmation) would be more effective than no-
affirmation, whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, group-affirmation (but not self-
affirmation) would be more effective than no-affirmation. The same procedure as that in Study 1 
was used, with two exceptions. First, participants experienced milder ostracism (i.e., five, rather 
than two, throws out of 30). Second, participants’ delayed (as well as immediate) responses to 
ostracism were measured. This was done because of evidence suggesting that, in some cases, 
situational moderators have a larger effect on delayed than on immediate reactions to ostracism 
(e.g., Goodwin et al., 2010; Van Beest & William, 2006; Van Beest, Williams, & Van Dijk, 
2011; Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006; Wirth & Williams, 2008).  
4.1 METHOD 
4.1.1 Participants and design 
Participants were 184 undergraduates (91 men) at the University of Pittsburgh who participated 
for course credit as part of an introductory psychology course. As in Study 1, participants were 
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randomly assigned to a 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) between-participants design. Twenty-nine participants were excluded from 
data analysis, five who did not follow experimental procedures, one who did not correctly recall 
co-players’ university affiliation, seven who had learned about Cyberball in class and were aware 
of its purpose, and 16 who showed suspicion about the Cyberball task. The final number of 
participants in each of the six conditions was: self-affirmation/ingroup (25), self-
affirmation/outgroup (24), group-affirmation/ingroup (28), group-affirmation/outgroup (25), no-
affirmation/ingroup (26), and no-affirmation/outgroup (27).3 
4.1.2 Procedure 
The procedure in Study 2 was identical to that in Study 1, with two exceptions. First, to induce 
moderate ostracism, participants received five out of 30 throws from their co-players (16.7%). 
The order of throws was randomly determined with the constraint that one throw occurred in 
each of the five blocks of six trials. Thus, participants received half of the throws they would 
expect if the ball were thrown equally to all three players. Second, in addition to the 
questionnaire items used in Study 1, which assessed participants’ (reflexive) reactions during the 
Cyberball game, participants also answered questions assessing their current (reflective) 
reactions to the game. Thus, for reflective aversiveness, participants were instructed to respond 
to the 20-item Need Satisfaction Scale based on how they were feeling “right now.” Similarly, 
for reflective emotional reactions, participants were instructed to answer the six emotion items 
based on their current feelings. This way of measuring reflective responses has been used in prior 
studies (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2010; Wirth & Williams, 2009; Zadro et al., 2004). For both 
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reflexive and reflective measures, aversiveness scores and emotional indices were calculated as 
in Study 1.  
4.2 RESULTS 
4.2.1 Manipulation checks 
4.2.1.1 Effectiveness of ostracism induction  To determine the extent to which participants felt 
excluded during the Cyberball game, we analyzed the combined score based on the two 
exclusion items (r = .81, p <.001) using a 3 (type of affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 
(source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANOVA. Results revealed that neither of the main 
effects nor the interaction was statistically significant, all Fs < 1.35, ps > .25, indicating that 
perceived exclusion was similar across the six conditions. Moreover, the overall level of 
perceived exclusion (Mgrand = 4.02, SDgrand = 0.96) was significantly higher than the mid-point of 
the response scale (3), t(154) = 13.27, p <.001. This value was also significantly lower than the 
overall level of perceived exclusion in Study1 (Mgrand = 4.49, SDgrand = 0.79), t(290) = 4.57, p < 
.001. In addition, we performed a 3 × 2 ANOVA on the percentage of throws that participants 
believed they received during the game. Results showed that neither of the main effects nor the 
interaction was statistically significant, all Fs < 0.67, ps > .52. Participants reported receiving an 
average of 12.59% (SD = 6.65) of the throws during the game, which was significantly lower 
than the 16.7% of throws they actually received, t(154) = 7.69, p < .001. This value was also 
significantly higher than that in Study 1 (M = 5.61%, SD = 3.42), t(290) = 10.69, p < .001. Taken 
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together, these findings indicated that, although participants experienced substantial ostracism, 
this ostracism was lower than that in Study 1. 
4.2.1.2 Attribution for exclusion  The index scores reflecting personal attribution (r = .66, p < 
.001) and group membership attribution (r = .88, p < .001) were submitted to a 3 (type of 
affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) x (2) 
(attribution type: personal characteristics vs. group membership) mixed ANOVA with type of 
affirmation and source of ostracism as between-participants variables and attribution type as a 
within-participants variable.  
We obtained three significant main effects and one significant interaction. The source of 
ostracism main effect indicated that outgroup ostracism (M = 4.39, SD = 1.46) triggered stronger 
overall attributions more than did ingroup ostracism (M = 2.42, SD = 1.48), F(1, 149) = 140.20, 
p < .001. The attribution type main effect indicated that participants attributed exclusion more to 
group membership (M = 3.62, SD = 2.43) than to personal characteristics (M = 3.17, SD = 1.59).  
F(1, 149) = 14.33, p < .001. Finally, the type of affirmation main effect, F(2, 149) = 3.31, p = 
.039, which was decomposed by pairwise comparisons, indicated that non-affirmed participants 
(M = 3.64, SD = 1.77) showed stronger attributions than self-affirmed participants (M = 3.12, SD 
= 1.84), p = .012, but not group-affirmed participants (M = 3.46, SD = 1.91), p = .36. No 
difference was found between self-affirmed and group-affirmed participants, p = .21. Of greater 
interest was the source of ostracism × attribution type interaction, F(1, 149) = 167.05, p < .001. 
As in Study 1, this interaction revealed that participants excluded by ingroup members attributed 
their treatment more to their personal characteristics (M = 3.39, SD = 1.69) than to their group 
membership (M = 1.46, SD = 0.90), F(1, 149) = 109.94, p <.001, while those excluded by 
outgroup members attributed their treatment more to their group membership (M = 5.86, SD = 
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1.13) than to their personal characteristics (M = 2.94, SD = 1.47), F(1, 149) = 242.19, p < .001. 
Remaining interactions did not attain statistical significance, all Fs < 1.42, ps > .24. 
4.2.2 Ostracism aversiveness 
For responses to the Need Satisfaction Scale, separate aversiveness scores were computed by 
averaging participants’ responses to the 20 items assessing reflexive responses (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .91) and the 20 items assessing reflective responses (Cronbach’s alpha = .91). For both 
indices, higher scores indicated greater aversiveness. The two kinds of scores were analyzed 
using 3 (type of affirmation: self- vs. group- vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. 
outgroup) ANOVAs (see Table 5).  
For reflexive aversiveness, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained 
statistical significance, all Fs < 1.21, ps > .30. Overall, the aversiveness of the Cyberball game 
(Mgrand = 3.71, SDgrand = 0.61) was significantly higher than the mid-point of the response scale 
(3), t(154) = 14.69, p < .001. Although the predicted interaction was not significant, the pattern 
of means was consistent with our hypothesis. Therefore, we performed planned contrasts within 
each of the two ostracism conditions. We found, as predicted, that in the ingroup ostracism 
condition self-affirmed participants (M = 3.49, SD = 0.53) reported significantly lower 
aversiveness than did non-affirmed participants (M = 3.84, SD = 0.67), F(1, 149) = 4.15, p = .04, 
whereas group-affirmed (M = 3.74, SD = 0.46) and non-affirmed participants reported similar 
aversiveness, F(1, 149) = 0.38, p = .54. In contrast, in the outgroup ostracism condition, although 
group-affirmed participants (M = 3.68, SD = 0.62) reported lower aversiveness than did non-
affirmed participants (M = 3.78, SD = 0.66), this difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 
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149) = 0.33, p = .57. In addition, self-affirmed participants (M = 3.75, SD = 0.67) and non-
affirmed participants reported similar aversiveness, F(1, 149) = 0.03, p = .87.  
For reflective aversiveness, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained 
statistical significance, all Fs < 0.37, ps > .68, and the pattern of means was not consistent with 
our hypothesis. Overall, the aversiveness of the game (Mgrand = 3.16, SDgrand = 0.67) was 
significantly higher than the mid-point of the response scale (3), t(154) = 3.06, p = .003.   
4.2.3 Emotional reactions 
For positive emotions, two index scores were computed by averaging participants’ responses to 
the three items assessing reflexive responses (Cronbach’s alpha = .85) and the three items 
assessing reflective responses (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). The two indices were analyzed using 3 
(type of affirmation: self- vs. group- vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
ANOVAs (see Table 6).  
For reflexive positive emotions, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained 
statistical significance, all Fs < 0.83, ps > .44. Overall, participants' level of positive emotion 
during the game (Mgrand = 2.40, SDgrand = 0.83) was significantly lower than the mid-point of the 
response scale (3), t(154) = 8.94, p < .001. Because the pattern of means was consistent with our 
hypothesis, we also performed planned contrasts parallel to those reported above. However, no 
significant differences were found within either of the ostracism conditions, all Fs < 0.92, ps 
>.34.   
For reflective positive emotions, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained 
statistical significance, all Fs < 0.51, ps > .57, and the pattern of means was not consistent with 
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our hypothesis. Overall, participants' level of positive emotion (Mgrand = 3.02, SDgrand = 0.78) did 
not differ significantly from the mid-point of the response scale (3), t(154) = 0.35, p = .73.  
Similarly, two index scores were computed for negative emotions by averaging 
participants’ responses to the three items assessing reflexive responses (Cronbach’s alpha = .79) 
and the three items assessing reflective responses (Cronbach’s alpha = .87). The two indices 
were analyzed using 3 × 2 ANOVAs (see Table 6).  
For reflexive negative emotions, neither of the main effects was significant, both Fs < 
0.83, ps > .44, but the type of affirmation × source of ostracism interaction was significant, 
F(2,149) = 3.49, p = .03. To decompose this interaction, planned contrasts were performed 
within each of the two ostracism conditions. In the ingroup ostracism condition, as predicted, 
self-affirmed participants (M = 2.37, SD = 0.85) reported significantly lower negative emotion 
than did non-affirmed participants (M = 3.09, SD = 0.87), F(1, 149) = 6.37, p = .01, whereas 
group-affirmed participants (M = 3.02, SD = 0.73) and non-affirmed participants reported similar 
negative emotion, F(1, 149) = 0.06, p = .81. In contrast, in the outgroup ostracism condition, 
neither group-affirmed participants (M = 2.61, SD = 1.26) nor self-affirmed participants (M = 
2.88, SD = 1.07) reported significantly lower negative emotion than did non-affirmed 
participants (M = 2.65, SD = 1.21), all Fs < 0.60, ps > .44.  
For reflective negative emotions, neither of the main effects nor the interaction attained 
statistical significance, Fs < 1.73, ps >.18. Overall, participants' level of negative emotion (Mgrand 
= 2.02, SDgrand = 1.00) was significantly lower than the mid-point of the response scale (3), 
t(154) = 12.06, p <.001. We also performed planned contrasts parallel to those reported above 
because the pattern of means was consistent with our hypothesis. However, no significant 
differences were found within either of the ostracism conditions, Fs < 2.46, ps > .12. 
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4.2.4 Hostility 
The two hostility index scores -- hostility toward co-players (Cronbach’s alpha = .76) and 
hostility toward co-players’ group (Cronbach’s alpha = .86) -- were analyzed using 3 (type of 
affirmation: self vs. group vs. none) × 2 (source of ostracism: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANOVAs 
(see Table 7). For hostility toward co-players, neither of the main effects nor the interaction 
attained statistical significance, all Fs < 2.91, ps> .09. Overall, participants' hostility toward co-
players (Mgrand = 3.31, SDgrand = 1.26) was significantly lower than the mid-point of the response 
scale (4), t(154) = 6.79, p < .001. For hostility toward co-players’ group, the source of ostracism 
main effect was significant, F(1,149) = 41.62, p < .001, indicating that participants excluded by 
outgroup members (M = 3.46, SD = 1.43) reported greater hostility than did those excluded by 
ingroup members (M = 2.12, SD = 1.16). The type of affirmation main effect and the interaction 
did not attain statistical significance, both Fs < 0.64, ps >.53.   
4.3 DISCUSSION 
The goal of Study 2 was to examine the effect of self- and group-affirmation on responses to 
“moderate” ingroup and outgroup ostracism. Our induction of moderate ostracism was successful 
-- Participants in all conditions felt excluded during the game, but the level of perceived 
exclusion was lower than that in Study 1. Also, as in Study 1, participants made “correct” 
attributions for their exclusion as a function of the source of their ostracism. Individuals 
ostracized by ingroup members attributed their exclusion primarily to their personal 
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characteristics, while those ostracized by outgroup members attributed their exclusion primarily 
to their group membership.  
We obtained mixed evidence for our hypotheses about the impact of self- and group-
affirmation on responses to ingroup and outgroup ostracism. On reflexive measures, we found, as 
predicted, that self-affirmation was more effective than group-affirmation in reducing the pain of 
ingroup ostracism. More specifically, self-affirmed (but not group-affirmed) participants 
reported significantly lower aversiveness and negative emotions than did non-affirmed 
participants when the source of ostracism was ingroup members. However, our prediction in the 
outgroup ostracism condition was not supported on reflexive measures. Here, group-affirmed 
participants did not report significantly lower aversiveness or negative emotions than did non-
affirmed participants. On reflective measures, neither of our hypotheses was confirmed. Instead, 
participants reported uniformly high aversiveness and negative emotions in all three affirmation 
conditions. Finally, participants’ reports of positive emotions did vary significantly across the six 
conditions on either reflexive or reflective measures. This finding is not surprising, given that 
positive emotions are probably not salient to participants in ostracism situations.  
As in Study 1, a significant effect of source of ostracism emerged regarding hostility 
toward co-players’ outgroup. Participants excluded by outgroup members revealed greater 
hostility toward co-players’ group than did participants excluded by ingroup members. 
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5.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In two studies, we examined the effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in reducing the 
aversiveness of ostracism by ingroup and outgroup members. We hypothesized that in the case 
of ingroup ostracism, which was assumed to threaten personal identity, self-affirmation (but not 
group-affirmation) would be more effective than no-affirmation in buffering against negative 
reactions, whereas in the case of outgroup ostracism, which was assumed to threaten social 
identity, group-affirmation (but not self-affirmation) would be more effective than no-
affirmation. In both experiments, participants completed either a self-affirming, group-affirming, 
or non-affirming writing task, after which they were excluded by either ingroup or outgroup 
members while playing a Cyberball game. In Study 1, strong ostracism was induced by giving 
participants 6.7% of the throws, whereas in Study 2, moderate ostracism was induced by giving 
participants 16.7% of the throws. Our manipulations of the level of ostracism and its source 
(ingroup vs. outgroup) were successful in both studies.  
We found in both studies that negative responses to ostracism (aversiveness ratings, 
negative emotions) did not differ between the two ostracism conditions. Regardless of whether 
ostracizers were ingroup or outgroup members, participants perceived the ostracism as highly 
aversive. This finding is consistent with prior studies showing that the magnitude of negative 
responses to ostracism does not fluctuate as a function of the ostracizers’ ingroup vs. outgroup 
membership (e.g., Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). 
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We also obtained evidence consistent with the assumption that ingroup and outgroup 
ostracism trigger different psychological responses. Specifically, in both experiments, 
participants who were excluded by ingroup members attributed their treatment predominantly to 
their personal characteristics, whereas those who were excluded by outgroup members attributed 
their treatment predominantly to their group membership. These findings suggest that ingroup 
ostracism threatens the positivity of personal identity, whereas outgroup ostracism threatens the 
positivity of social identity.  
Concerning the differential effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in reducing the 
aversiveness of ingroup and outgroup ostracism, we found that, when ostracism was strong 
(Study 1), neither kind of affirmation mitigated reflexive negative responses to either kind of 
ostracism. In contrast, when ostracism was moderate (Study 2), we found some evidence for 
differential effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation in the reducing the aversiveness of 
ingroup and outgroup ostracism. As hypothesized, in the case of ingroup ostracism, self-
affirmation, but not group-affirmation, reduced reflexive aversiveness ratings and negative 
emotions compared to no affirmation. In contrast, in the case of outgroup ostracism, our 
hypothesis that group-affirmation, but not self-affirmation, would reduce reflexive aversiveness 
ratings and negative responses compared to no affirmation was not supported. Finally, we did not 
obtain support for our hypotheses on reflective measures in Study 2, and positive emotions did 
not vary as a function of condition in either study.  
Three aspects of our findings are particularly interesting -- (1) stronger support for our 
hypotheses in a moderate ostracism than in a strong ostracism situation, (2) significant results on 
reflexive but not on reflective measures, and (3) hypothesis-consistent results involving self-
affirmation in the ingroup ostracism condition but not group-affirmation in the outgroup 
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ostracism condition. The first and second aspects are relevant to the temporal need-threat model 
of ostracism (Williams, 2009), which posits that (strong) ostracism is extremely painful and 
produces immediate (reflexive) negative responses that are not moderated by personal or 
situational variables. According to the model, however, such variables can exert effects on 
subsequent (reflective) responses. The fact that we obtained stronger support for our hypotheses 
(which involve moderation by situational variables) in Study 2 than in Study 1 is consistent with 
Williams’s assumption that moderation is more likely to occur when the pain of ostracism is 
“reduced.” However, the fact we obtained significant results on reflexive but not on reflective 
measures does not seem consistent with Williams’s model. It may be the case, however, that in 
Study 2, where the pain of ostracism was initially moderate rather than high (as in Williams’s 
studies), this pain dissipated so much by the time the reflective measures were obtained that no 
moderation effects could be detected.  
How might we explain the third aspect of our results, namely the effects of self- and 
group-affirmation in the ingroup and outgroup ostracism conditions? The fact that self-
affirmation, but not group  affirmation, was effective in the ingroup ostracism condition is 
consistent with our argument that the match between the level of identity being threatened by 
ostracism and the level of  identity being bolstered by affirmation is critical in determining the 
efficacy of affirmation. But why was group-affirmation not effective in the outgroup ostracism 
condition? One possible explanation involves our dependent variables -- aversiveness and 
(negative) emotional reactions. Given that all the relevant questionnaire items assessed 
participants’ personal feelings regarding ostracism, these items may not have captured 
participants’ group-based feelings, which are likely to be more closely aligned with their social 
identity. If so, our dependent measures may not have allowed an adequate test of the group-
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affirmation hypothesis. Another possible explanation involves the complexity of group-
affirmation. Although a majority of past studies found that group-affirmation decreased 
collective defense and group-serving biases (e.g., Derks et al., 2009; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; 
Sherman et al., 2007), this was not always the case (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; Ehrlich & 
Gramzow, 2015). Group affirmation was not effective in studies in which the group was affirmed 
in the same domain as they were threatened (see Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997). 
The fact that participants in our studies were in this situation may at least partially explain why 
we did not obtain the predicted effect of group-affirmation in the outgroup ostracism condition. 
Supporting this notion, a recent study found that affirming an alternative group membership was 
effective in protecting participants’ self-esteem from a threat to their ingroup (Spencer-Rodger, 
Major, Forster, & Peng, 2016). Clearly, more work on the impact of group affirmation in 
ostracism situations is warranted. 
5.1 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Several directions for future research should be noted. One direction concerns the need for direct 
evidence that ingroup ostracism threatens the positivity of personal identity, whereas outgroup 
ostracism threatens the positivity of social identity. Although our attributional findings are 
consistent with this assumption, future research should assess the two kinds of threat in more 
direct ways. A second direction, mentioned earlier, concerns the need for better measurement of 
participants’ group-based feelings in the context of group-affirmation. Using different items to 
assess personal feelings in response to self-affirmation and group-based feelings in response to 
group-affirmation seems highly advisable. A third direction concerns the mechanisms underlying 
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the effectiveness of self- and group-affirmation. For example, we suggested earlier that self- and 
group-affirmation increase the accessibility of cognitions about positive characteristics of 
personal and social identity, respectively (Derks, et al., 2009), which serve as psychological 
resources in coping with threats (see Critcher & Dunning, 2014; Lalonde, 1992). In future work, 
it would be useful to explore the psychological processes mediating the relation between self- 
and group-affirmation and response to ingroup and outgroup ostracism.  
At a more general level, future research would benefit from a deeper exploration of 
situational factors that might moderate responses to ostracism. Considering that prior studies that 
failed to find evidence for moderation focused primarily on factors that are present in the 
ostracism context, such as source characteristics (e.g., Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007) and 
intentionality of exclusion (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 2003), our work suggests that factors that 
precede ostracism (i.e., self-affirmation) may have a greater potential for moderating negative 
responses to ostracism. For example, some studies have found that fostering certain 
psychological states before ostracism, such as holding a posture that signals dominance (Welker, 
Oberleitner, Cain, & Carré, 2013) and having the companionship of a close other (Teng & Chen, 
2012), reduced negative responses to ostracism. This may occur because these factors, like self-
affirmation, fortify participants’ positive self-image prior to ostracism. Putting it in another way, 
because individuals immediately react to ostracism once it is detected (Williams, 2009), threat-
alleviating interventions may be more effective when they precede the exclusion than when they 
follow it. Future research addressing this possibility is therefore likely to make a substantial 
contribution to the literature on ostracism and coping strategies.  
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5.2 CONCLUSION 
Our study was the first to connect two important bodies of social psychological research -- 
ostracism and affirmation -- and to test the hypothesis that the efficacy of affirmation in reducing 
the pain of ostracism depends on the match between the level of identity being threatened by 
ostracism and the level of identity being bolstered by affirmation. We found that when the source 
of ostracism was ingroup members and the level of ostracism was moderate, self-affirmation was 
an effective intervention in mitigating negative responses to ostracism. These findings suggest 
the utility of future research designed to clarify the buffering effect of different kinds of 
affirmation on responses to different kinds of ostracism. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of the two attitude indices in the pilot study 
 
 
 
Target Pitt attitude Outgroup attitude Difference 
CMU 4.80 (0.71) 4.08 (0.79) 0.85 (0.63) 
PSU 3.46 (0.94) 3.85 (0.83) 0.65 (0.77) 
WVU 2.93 (1.07) 3.67 (0.83) 0.83 (0.78) 
SYC 4.30 (0.65) 4.22 (0.63) 0.45 (0.44) 
IUP 3.45 (0.89) 4.27 (0.70) 0.97 (0.99) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. CMU = Carnegie Mellon University; PSU = 
Penn State University; WVU = West Virginia University; SYC = Syracuse University; IUP = 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Pitt attitude = Pitt students’ attitudes toward outgroup 
students; Outgroup attitude = Pitt students’ assumptions about the attitudes of outgroup students 
toward Pitt students. Higher values indicate more positive attitudes. Difference scores reflect the 
absolute difference between the two attitude indices.  
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of aversiveness scores in Study 1 
 
 
 
 Source of ostracism  
Type of affirmation Ingroup members Outgroup members Overall 
Self-affirmation 4.13 (0.36) 4.19 (0.66) 4.16 (0.52) 
Group-affirmation 4.10 (0.64) 4.12 (0.50) 4.11 (0.56) 
No-affirmation 4.04 (0.43) 4.17 (0.54) 4.11 (0.49) 
Overall 4.09 (0.48) 4.16 (0.56) 4.12 (0.52) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Higher scores reflect greater aversiveness. 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of emotional reaction scores in Study 1 
 
 
 
  Source of ostracism  
 Type of affirmation Ingroup members Outgroup members Overall 
Positive 
emotion 
Self-affirmation 2.13 (0.62) 2.03 (0.88) 2.08 (0.75) 
Group-affirmation 2.35 (1.07) 2.35 (0.96) 2.35 (1.00) 
No-affirmation 2.42 (0.81) 1.99 (0.88) 2.21 (0.86) 
Overall 2.30 (0.84) 2.13 (0.91) 2.21 (0.88) 
Negative 
emotion 
Self-affirmation 3.30 (0.88) 3.35 (1.09) 3.33 (0.98) 
Group-affirmation 3.22 (1.10) 3.00 (1.02) 3.10 (1.05) 
No-affirmation 3.13 (0.92) 3.25 (0.98) 3.18 (0.94) 
Overall 3.22 (0.96) 3.19 (1.02) 3.20 (0.99) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Higher scores reflect stronger emotion. 
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Table 4. Means and standard deviations of hostility scores in Study 1 
 
 
 
  Source of ostracism  
 Type of affirmation Ingroup members Outgroup members Overall 
Hostility 
toward  
co-players 
Self-affirmation 3.66 (1.29) 4.25 (1.66) 3.95 (1.50) 
Group-affirmation 3.93 (1.50) 3.48 (0.96) 3.69 (1.24) 
No-affirmation 3.61 (1.17) 3.62 (1.43) 3.62 (1.26) 
Overall 3.73 (1.31) 3.77 (1.39) 3.75 (1.35) 
Hostility 
toward  
co-players' 
group 
Self-affirmation 2.49 (1.36) 3.49 (1.59) 2.98 (1.53) 
Group-affirmation 2.30 (1.34) 3.53 (1.52) 2.96 (1.55) 
No-affirmation 2.80 (1.10) 3.29 (1.45) 3.04 (1.29) 
Overall 2.54 (1.27) 3.44 (1.49) 2.99 (1.45) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Higher scores reflect stronger hostility.   
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations of aversiveness scores in Study 2 
 
 
 
  Source of ostracism  
 Type of affirmation Ingroup members Outgroup members Overall 
Reflexive 
response 
Self-affirmation 3.49 (0.53) 3.75 (0.67) 3.62 (0.61) 
Group-affirmation 3.74 (0.46) 3.68 (0.62) 3.71 (0.54) 
No-affirmation 3.84 (0.67) 3.78 (0.66) 3.81 (0.66 
Overall 3.69 (0.57) 3.74 (0.64) 3.71 (0.61) 
Reflective 
response 
Self- affirmation 3.14 (0.70) 3.19 (0.58) 3.16 (0.64) 
Group-affirmation 3.04 (0.59) 3.19 (0.81) 3.11 (0.70) 
No-affirmation 3.25 (0.72) 3.18 (0.62) 3.22 (0.67) 
Overall 3.14 (0.67) 3.19 (0.67) 3.16 (0.67) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Higher scores reflect greater aversiveness.  
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations of emotional reaction scores in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
  Source of ostracism  
 
 Type of affirmation 
Ingroup 
members 
Outgroup 
members 
Overall 
Positive 
emotion 
Reflexive 
response 
Self-affirmation 2.53 (0.89) 2.40 (0.83) 2.47 (0.86) 
Group-affirmation 2.46 (0.71) 2.47 (0.80) 2.47 (0.75_ 
No-affirmation 2.31 (0.70) 2.26 (1.04) 2.28 (0.88) 
Overall 2.43 (0.76) 2.37 (0.90) 2.40 (0.83) 
Reflective 
response 
Self-affirmation 2.89 (0.61) 3.06 (0.77) 2.97 (0.69) 
Group-affirmation 3.11 (0.80) 3.00 (0.74) 3.06 (0.76) 
No-affirmation 2.95 (0.84) 3.11 (0.91) 3.03 (0.87) 
Overall 2.99 (0.75) 3.06 (0.87) 3.02 (0.78) 
Negative 
emotion 
Reflexive 
response 
Self-affirmation 2.37 (0.85) 2.88 (1.07) 2.62 (0.99) 
Group-affirmation 3.02 (0.73) 2.61 (1.26) 2.83 (1.03) 
No-affirmation 3.09 (0.87) 2.65 (1.21) 2.87 (1.07) 
Overall 2.84 (0.87) 2.71 (1.17) 2.78 (1.03) 
Reflective 
response 
Self- affirmation 1.77 (0.90) 2.21 (1.00) 1.99 (0.96) 
Group-affirmation 2.07 (0.87) 1.93 (1.12) 2.00 (0.99) 
No-affirmation 2.22 (1.16) 1.95 (1.00) 2.08 (1.08) 
Overall 2.03 (0.99) 2.02 (1.03) 2.02 (1.00) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Higher scores reflect stronger emotion.  
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Table 7. Means and standard deviations of hostility scores in Study 2 
 
 
 
  Source of ostracism  
 Type of affirmation Ingroup members Outgroup members Overall 
Hostility 
toward  
co-players 
Self-affirmation 3.07 (1.38) 3.67 (1.28) 3.36 (1.35) 
Group-affirmation 3.28 (1.29) 3.25 (1.11) 3.26 (1.20) 
No-affirmation 3.08 (0.81) 3.55 (1.56) 3.32 (1.26) 
Overall 3.15 (1.17) 3.49 (1.33) 3.31 (1.26) 
Hostility 
toward  
co-players' 
group 
Self-affirmation 1.79 (0.93) 3.47 (1.14) 2.61 (1.33) 
Group-affirmation 2.35 (1.28) 3.49 (1.43) 2.89 (1.46) 
No-affirmation 2.19 (1.19) 3.44 (1.69) 2.83 (1.58) 
Overall 2.12 (1.16) 3.46 (1.43) 2.78 (1.46) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Participants responded to all items using a 7-
point scale. Higher scores reflect stronger hostility.   
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Depiction of the Cyberball game for the ingroup ostracism condition 
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Figure 2. Depiction of the Cyberball game for the outgroup ostracism condition 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 Analyses with and without excluded participants yielded the same pattern of findings. 
2 The four items assessing group identification were highly inter-correlated in both Study 1 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .86) and Study 2 (Cronbach’s alpha = .88). Thus, in each study, an index 
score of group identification was computed by reverse-coding responses to appropriate items and 
then averaging responses across the four items. To examine whether group identification 
moderated the effect of group-affirmation, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted in 
both Study 1 and Study 2 predicting each of the dependent variables from type of affirmation 
(dummy-coded), source of ostracism (dummy-coded), group identification (centered), and all 
possible two-way and three-way interaction terms. Results showed that neither the main effect of 
group identification (|β |s < .28, ps > .26 for Study 1;  |β |s < .08, ps > .65 for Study 2) nor any 
interaction term involving group identification ((|β |s < .28, ps > .22 in Study 1; |β |s < .31, ps > 
.14 in Study 2) attained statistical significance in predicting any of the dependent measures. The 
grand mean of group identification was 4.59 (SD = 1.25) in Study 1 and 4.39 (SD = 1.37) in 
Study 2. Therefore, in the present studies, group identification did not moderate the effect of 
group affirmation. 
3 Analyses with and without excluded participants yielded the same pattern of findings. 
